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INTRODUCTION •
The year 1922 Is seen as a turning point In the history of the
trade union movement In South Africa. In that year 25 000 white
miners on the Rand came out on strike demanding job protection
and increased wages. The strike was crushed by the Smuts
government with 153 people killed and over 500 Injured. But, In
the words of Rob Davies,
although the strike Itself was defeated It
was nonetheless one of the crucial watersheds
In the evolution of social class relations 1n
the South African formation.(1) -
While the state protected the interests of mining capital by
crushing the strike it also moved towards incorporating white
wage earners as a supportive class and ending Industrial
conflict.
Amongst other things the Rand strike prompted the South African
Party government to enact the Industrial Conciliation Act in the
hope that It would "defuse workers' militancy and create further
divisions In the South African workforce so as to weaken it".(2)
In order to accomplish this the act laid down complex bargaining
procedures, extensive requirements before a legal strike could
take place and refused recognition to trade unions which had in
their ranks pass - bearing blacks.(3)
In the following years the hopes of the state were largely
realised as most white workers became enmeshed in bureaucratic,
non - militant, racially exclusive trade unions. Yet white
workers were not simply trapped by the act. Incorporation was a
process which took over ten years or more to accomplish and was
determined by the specific conditions facing trade unions.
Indeed some trade unions (especially the craft based ones) had
been cooperating with the state and capital since World War One
to protect the position of skilled white workers.
There is one trade union which it is maintained went against all
these trends: the Garment Workers' Union (GWU) under the
leadership of Its general secretary Solly Sachs, between 1928 and
1952. The GWU, it has been asserted, revived industrial
militancy, committed itself to worker control and managed to
retain its commitment to non - racialism. All these assertions
require some form of qualification but'this paper will only focus
on the last one as this has been promoted as the hope for South
Africa. Here was a trade union which had almost exclusively
Afrikaner women as members and showed signs, of what Lewis has'
called, of "genuine Inter - racial solidarity".(4) If this could
be extended to the whole of South Africa then, according to Basfl
Davidson, writing in the Mew Statesman In 19S0, there could be
hope for white and black in South Africa.(5)
This paper will take a closer examination of the GWU's racial-
policies in the late 1920s and early thirties In order to examine
the validity of these assertions. Although the GWU's racial
policy became a much more central issue to the union after 1936
when blacks started entering the clothing Industry In the
Transvaal In greater numbers, its roots-were Implanted well
before then.(6) Indeed the trends which were established In the
earlier period between 1928 and 1936 played a key role in shaping
the relationships between the GWU and black workers in the
industry in later years. This paper will examine these trends and
how they were established in the first ten years of Solly Sachs'
tenureship as general secretary of the GWU. In order to do this:
it Is first of all neccessary to understand the nature of the
clothing industry, the Garment Workers' Union and the workforce
in the industry in those early years
THE CLOTHING INDUSTRY AND THE GWU
The trade union which Solly Sachs became secretary of in 1928 was
undergoing the first phase of a transition.(7) Originally
established in 1913 under the name the Witwatersrand Tailors
Association (WTA).the union initially only catered for those
workers engaged in the tailoring section of the clothing industry
on the Witwatersrand. The making of clothes had initially been a
skilled craft performed by tailors who had immigrated to South
Africa from Eastern Europe. Factory production had taken off
during World War One when imports almost ground to a halt. In
factories workers were placed in a set and each worker completed
one process in the making up of the garment. The set rather than
the individual would therefore complete the garment.
Most of these factory workers were Afrikaans speaking white women
and the WTA excluded them from Its ranks. At the end of the First
World War the WTA had engaged In a series of struggles over cuts
in wages. These.struggles culminated In a strike in 1922 which
ended in defeat for the union with a general reduction In wages
being accepted. In 1923 the WTA decided, following Its
ignomonious defeat, to strengthen its organisation by accepting
factory workers. The Association was Internally divided Into two
sections: "the factory section and the bespoke tailoring section.
From this stage onwards numerically it was women {who were mostly
factory workers) who were to dominate the union. The number of
male members declined from 415 in 1925 to 300 in 1928, while over
the same, period female membership rose from 787 to 1550.(8) Yet,
despite their numerical predominance, women "had Tittle or no say
in the policy and the management of the union".(9) The union
offialdom was merely interested in issues affecting bespoke
tailors, such as immigrant tailors and bespoke tailoring in
factories,(10) and tended to neglect gross violations of the
agreements in factories.
Even so the union was undergoing a transition even before Solly
Sachs took over in 1928. The WTA encouraged its members to
participate actively in the affairs of the union. It rallied them
to pay their subscriptions regularly, to report any complaints to
shop - stewards, to encourage other workers to join the union, to
attend meetings and not to work overtime.(11) Although women did
start attending meetings and began participating in the affairs
of the union, they were still treated on a paternalist basis.(12)
The coming of Solly Sachs speeded up this transition process
immensly. Over the next four years the union emerged from its-
cocoon and began using the strike Weapon to challenge the
employers. Wage registers were continually checked and strikes
became frequent occurrences In the clothing industry on the
Witwatersrand. A new constitution was adopted by the GWU In July
1929.(13) A great deal of emphasis in the constitution was placed
on the general meeting as the structure through which members
were able to express their views and elect and revoke officials.
(14) Although management of the union was vested in the hands of
the Central Executive Committee (CEC), this was subject to the
direction and control of general meetings.(15) On the executive
the bespoke tailoring and factory section had equal
representation, giving the former grouping a measure of power far
in excess of their numbers.(16) In 1930 the name of the union was'
formally altered from the WTA, with Its craft emphasis, to the
GWU, with its industry wide ramifications.
The next two years saw strikes in the industry reach their zenith
culminating in two general strikes in 1931 and 1932 as the
Transvaal Clothing Manufacturers Association (TCMA), the
organisation representing employers in the clothing industry in
the Transvaal, tried to reduce wages. Although the union managed
to resist the wage cut successfully in 1931, the following year
it succumbed under heavy pressure from the manufacturers and the
government. The GWU was heavily defeated and its ranks were
depleted. Solly Sachs was banned from being in the Transvaal for
twelve months, a restriction which was lifted with the election
of the fusion government In 1933.
Yet out of the depths of defeat the GWU regathered its resouces
and began to rebuild. The remainder of the old guard was finally
ejected and new leaders such as Anna Scheepers, Katie viljoen,
Johanna and Hester Cornelius replaced them. Eventually, in 1934,
the bespoke tailoring section seceded from the GWU to form the
Tailoring Workers Industrial Union. The employers also began to
realise the value of haying one strong single union with which to
negotiate and in 1937 the closed shop clause, which had been in
abeyance since 1932, was Inserted into the agreement between the
GWU and the TCMA. By the late 1930s the GWU was well on its
course to becoming one of the strongest trade unions in South
Africa. .
THE WORKFORCE IN THE CLOTHING INDUSTRY
Up to 1928 there were very few blacks in the clothing industry in
the Transvaal. Although it is very difficult to obtain accurate
statistics of the racial composition of the workforce In the
1920s it is clear that most of the workers were white women
machinists.If one uses the industrial census reports one can come
to a rough estimate of the racial composition of the workforce In
the clothing^and textile Industry on the Witwatersrand. From
these figures It appears that the number of Indians rose from 90
in 1925 - 26 to 106 in 1926 - 27 and 109 in 1928 - 29.(17) Their
proportion of the workforce thus hardly ever rose above 21.(18)
Whites on the other hand constituted a steady 66% of the
workforce.(19) It was rather Africans who contributed the second
largest slice to the labouring population In the Industry. The
industrial census figures record an increase In African workers
from 964 in 1925 - 26 to 1 101 in 1926 - 27 and 1 533 In 1928 -
29, thus constituting a fairly stable 28 to 30$ of the workforce
for the period under review.(20) This "encroachment of native
labour" at least in absolute terms was soon to become a source of
concern for the WTA.(21)
As was noted earlier the white women would work together In
teams to sew the garment together using sewing machines. There
was a distict division between them and the African workforce In
the factories. Africans in the clothing Industry were involved in
three major occupations: cleaning, laying out and pressing.(22)
The first entailed sweeping the factory floor and the second the
laying of the cloth on the table for the cutters. Pressing of
garments also involved little skill. In one factory in order to
press the clothing, the manufacturer, "simply had these garments
folded and allowed a native to sit on the. pile, the resulting
pressure being sufficient for all practical purposes".(23) The
operation was not usually as crude as this and tended to be
carried out using a large steam press which- merely had to be
opened and closed in a vertical motion. This contrasted markedly
with skilled pressing which was predominant in bespoke tailoring
establishments. Here each garment had to be carefully pressed
with a hand iron to ensure a neat crease.(24) This latter type
of pressing was becoming increasingly uncommon as as factory
production burgeoned and tailoring diminished. As the TCMA was
to comment to the Wage Board, "the clothing industry is
such...that it does not warrant the employment of skilled
pressers as they are not necessary in the trade in question".
(25)
Unlike African workers Indians were mainly employed in tailoring
workshops. Tailoring involved the making up of a suit of clothes
to fit a clients personal rquirements. Although tailoring started
out as being the preserve of a single tailor the tasks were also
increasingly becoming sub - divided. Nonetheless it was still
conducted on a small scale in filthy rooms which required little
overheads. Very Tow wages and sweating, the speeding up of work
to meet sudden demands for clothing, were a standard feature of
these establishments.
Both the employment of Africans as pressers and Indians as
workers in tailoring; workshops presented the WTA with serious
problems. In both cases it threatened the positions of a
constituency of its membership.
In the case of the pressers the WTA, with its craft union base,
was deeply concerned that this process of deskiiUng would lead
to unemployment of a Targe proportion of Its male membership. In
the face of factory production ft attempted to create a Job
monopoly on certain categories of labour. One of the ways 1n
which It sought to accomplish this was through the erection of
colour bars. In 1924 it called for African pressers 1n the
Industry to be replaced by whites.(26) The manufacturers paid no
attention to this plea" for the obvious reason that they had no
need to employ skilled white pressers at high wages when
unskilled Africans could perform the job as adequately at a
cheaper cost. With the government at the time trying to find
employment for the thousands of poor whites the setting of high
wages was not an attractive proposition. The only alternative
left for the WTA was to try and organise Arican workers In the
Industry and thus ensure that the wages of whites were not
undercut. As early as 1927, Glass, the general secretary of the
WTA, asserted that the asssociatioh would
very shortly be faced with the problem of
either organising them tthe natives) or
submitting to a reduction of wages
because of the competition of their low
standards of life.(27)
Trade union organisation was therefore seen as one way In which
African labour would not undercut white wages and jobs.
The low wages being paid to Indian workers presented possibly an
even greater threat to the WTA. They could undercut white wages
and even perhaps lead to them losing their jobs. It therefore
became Imperative for the WTA to organise Indian workers.
ORGANISING THE INDIAN WORKERS
Between 1929 and 1932 there were 72 tailoring workshops run by
Indians in the centre of Johannesburg, Jeppe, Hillbrow,
Braamfontein and Fordsburg and 21 on the Reef.(28.) These tailors
were . organised into ' the Transvaal Indian Tailors'
Association(TITA). They employed in total 165 Indian workers, 98%
of whom were men.(29) The workers in these small workshops- were
unorganised and subject to forms of extreme exploitation. Many
of the workers were members of the tailors family and obliged to
carry out the labour free of charge or for very little.(30) Child
labour was particularly prevalent in these workshops. A
blacklist was also circulated and when a worker was sacked by an
Indian employer no other Indian employer would hire him.(31) The
terms of the bespoke tailoring agreeement, to which the TITA was
a party, were hardly ever taken notice of, never mind adhered
to.(32)
In October 1928 the WTA began taking steps towards organising
Indian workers.(33) The WTA had decided that in order to
preserve the position of its members it was necessary to organise
Indian workers. "So long as a large number of workers, whatever
their race or colour may be, remain unorganised the conditions
of the organised workers are always in great danger."(34)
Conversely if the Indian workers were organised "an improvement
in their conditions is bound to come about and the conditions of
the organised workers would also be secured more effectively".
(35)
While there was general consensus among the WTA executive that
Indians should be organised there were debates over how this
organisation should be constituted. The chairman, H.Lee,
suggested that the Indians should fora their own section which
which would be a part of the union. Solly Sachs concurred with
this view.(36) Both Sachs and Lee implied that their views on
this matter were based upon the deep racial prejudice which they
felt the white workers were imbued with. The. Rev,Sigomony, an
Indian minister of the Anglican church, a man who "had taken a
very great Interest in the labour movement", was a guest at the
executive meeting which discussed this question.(37) His speech
at the meeting ran contrary to what both Sachs and Lee had said.
He favoured Indians forming independent unions. He was definitely
against parallels.(38) Nonetheless, the WTA decided to go ahead
and form a parallel union for Indian workers. In this way It
ensured that it could offer these members organisational support
and leadership while at the same time ensuring that the parallel
would be firmly under the WTA's control. .
 : •
As a result of this executive meeting the WTA decided to call a
meeting of Indian workers.(39) At this meeting the workers
appointed an executive and decided to organise into a trade union
section.(40) They also requested that the WTA convene a meeting
with the Indian tailors over infringements of the agreement and
to organise a dance to raise funds. This the WTA Central
Executive agreed to do. (41)
At this stage the Indian tailors began putting pressure on their
workers to ignore these organisational efforts. They intimidated
the workers with threats of losing their jobs if they attended
union meetings and the TITA refused to meet the WTA to discuss
the enforcement of terms of the agreement.(42) This pressure on
the part of the Indian tailors seems to have paid off for there
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is no mention of any attempt to organise the Indian workers again
until July 1930.
The spur for the second attempt to organise Indian workers arose
out of the initiative of the white Master tailors and. the. bespoke
tailoring industrial council. The white tailors- were vitally
interested in the gross exploitation of Indian workers as this
was enabling the Indian taiolrs to undercut prices. According to
one tailor Indian competition was a great menace to the
tailoring Industry because "they work all hours of the day and
night at low wages".(43) Another, In much more vehement tones,
expressed the opinion that "The question of Indian competition is
becoming a vey serious menace to the tailoring trade".(44) On
behalf of these tailors the bespoke council launched a campaign
to publicise the agreement among Indian tailors and to ensure
that it was adhered to. The council proposed circulating the
agreement to the Indian tailors' through the Transvaal Indian
Congress yet nothing seems to have come of this.(45) It was only
when agents of the council visited these establishments and
threatened prosecution that the Indian tailors began to adhere to
the agreement.(46) In addition the TITA agreed to assist the GWU
"In evey way possible" to organise the workers in the Indian
owned workshops.(47) The GWU, encouraged by the progress made by
the council, again began its attempts to organise Indian workers.
The GWU executive met In August 1930 and started working out
plans in connection with the affiliation of Indian workers to the
GWU.(48) Finally, In June 1931 the GWU and the Indian tailoring
workers entered into an affiliation agreement.(49)
A close examination of this agreement reveals that the GWU at the
same time gave the Indian workers support yet still kept them
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firmly within the GWU's ambit. The Indian Tailoring Workers
Section was to pay the GWU an affiliation fee in return for
administrative assistance. The executive of the Indian section
controlled its own internal affairs, but it was "subject to the
supervision of the Central Executive Committee of the Union".(50)
In relations vith management the Indian section did not have its
own say either- The section had to consult the GWU before any
final decision was reached with management.'
The agreement between the GWU and the Indian section in effect
performed a dual function. On the one hand it had created a
parallel union to which the GWU would offer financial and
administrative assistance thus facilitating the organisation of
Indian workers by the parallel. Yet this support was in exchange
for a great deal of control which the GWU was to exercise over
its parallel. Seeking to monopolise jobs in an ever diminishing
craft the agreement with the Indian tailoring workers gave them
the means to accomplish this more effectively.
The related growth of worker organisation and the actions of the
bespoke council did little to deter the Indian tailors from their
practices of gross exploitation. ' Despite their assurances to the
council they carried on very much as before claiming that they
had to pay low wages in order to "cater for the native trade"
which required cheaper garments.(51) The council refused to
concede this point since Indian tailoring shops also catered for
"a large number of European artisans, clerks, civil servants
etc".(52) Lengthy negotiations on this issue were conducted and
in 1933 an agreement was eventually reached whereby the Indian
tailors agreed to observe all the terms of the agreement except
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for the wage clause where they were exempted to pay 60% of the
agreement rates.(53) Even then the contraventions continued
unabated. The GWU's efforts to improve conditions of the workers
were frustrated by workers who colluded with their employers and
accepted'lower wages than those prescribed in the agreement.(54)
The Chairman of the bespoke council reported that "even under the
new lower rates about 4350 back pay was collected".(55)
The Indian section of the GWU therefore did not achieve very much
in the direction of alleviating the conditions of the Indian
workers. Most of the members had "failed to become loyal and
honest trade unionists" and in the opinion of the GWU Central
Executive, the Management Committee of the Section "was largely
Influenced by the bosses outlook on questions".(56) Furthemore
the Section was proving difficult for the GWU to control. At a
time when the GWU was suffering a critical shortage of money the
section only offered to pay the GWU SI a month affiliation fee,
while the union demanded 42.2.0 per month for "three years loyal
service.(57) This was at a time when the section was spending
money on community organisation than the union in particular. The
GWU was particularly angered by this expenditure. "All monies
collected in the funds of the Union must be spent exclusively on
matters affecting the Union and Its members, and for no other
purposes", the Central Executive Committee proclaimed.(58) The
section's agreement with the union was terminated by the union
and thereafter it seems to have collapsed, as there is no further
mention of it In the records. (59) Indian workers were later
Incorporated Into the number two branch of the union established
In 1935.
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THE SOUTH AFRICAN CLOTHING WORKERS' UNION
The organisation of African workers presented the WTA with a set
of different problems from that when it tried to organise Indian
workers. Foremost among these was the provision of the Industrial
Conciliation Act which prohibited a registered union from having
in its ranks pass - bearing blacks.
Registration was nonetheless not a major obstacle In the
organisation of trade unions. In 1925 the Pact government had
passed the Wage Act in order promote to employment among non -
unionised white workers by setting high minimum wages through a
Wage Board. As it was prohibited for the Board to discriminate on
grounds of race and colour when making recommendations organised
groups of African workers inundated the Board with applications
from its Inception In .1926. , ;.
The clothing industry, as It was one of the largest employers of
white labour in South Africa, was included in the Minister of
Labour's first reference to the Wage Board.(60) It seems that he
hoped that the wages set by the Board would entice even more
whites into the industry. The Board, after much opposition from
manufacturers who argued that they would have to close down If
they paid higher wages, published a determination.(61) This
determination only covered the clothing Industry 1n the Cape,
Natal and Free State since, the Board stated, the industry in the
Transvaal was covered by an industrial council agreement.(62)
The problem here was that the African workers in the Transavaal
were not covered by the agreement. Both African clothing workers
and the WTA were unhappy with the non-inclusion of the Transvaal
in the determination since no official wage regulating body had
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been constituted to cover the African's sphere of employment.
Therefore, with the assistance of the. Communist Party and the
WTA, African workers in the clothing industry were organised into
a representative body which could make representations to the
Wage Board, the South African Clothing Workers' Union (SACWUh
(63)
The SACWU launched a concerted campaign to press the Wage Board
into extending the scope of its determination.(64) It is
noteworthy that this pressure was exerted "indepedently and .in
conjunction" with the WTA.(65) The WTA was thus not only
assisting in the organisation of African Workers but also
attempting to ensure that Africans were paid a legally
enforceable wage which, in turn, would prevent undercutting of
white wages. In 1928 wages of Africans in the industry varied
from 7/6 to 20/- per week.(66) The starting wage for both white
male and female employees was 41.0.0 per week, with the wages of
females reaching &2.10.0 and males 45.0.0.(67) The Tow wages paid
to African males did not threaten the jobs of white females, but
rather white males who were engaged in skilled pressing. Since
the leaderhip of the WTA was dominated by white males it is not
surprising that the WTA pressed for a Wage Board determination to
prevent this undercutting.
The second major problem in relation to organising African,
workers lay in the.attitudes of the majority of the members of
the WTA. While the leadership remained in the hands of white
males it was Afrikaner women who were numerically dominant in the
union. Although they were divided in the workplace from the
African workers many of them had arrived in the city deeply
imbued with specific racial attitudes. These attitudes centred
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on the "notions of white "baaskap' and Afrikaner exclusivism "..
(68) Johanna Cornelius, for instance, related that it took her
years to get used to the idea that the English were human "while
for a long time after that she continued to regard the Africans
as being "pretty well sub - human'".(69) In her evidence before
the GWU Commission of Inquiry in 1949, Johanna Pretorious, a
member of the CEC, stated that she was educated so that she. knew
her place and the black knew its place.(70) In more blunt terms,
another member of the CEC has stated that they (the whites in the
clothing industry) had It in their minds that "'n Kaffir was 'n
Kaffir" and "under no circumstances were they going to have
blacks".(71) \
There was thus a real reluctance on the part of the women to
assist organising African male workers and to help them In their
struggles. Johanna Cornelius recalled that:
When Mr.Sachs brought It forward at a general meeting
we should ask the same wages for black men because by that
time they already came In as pressers as a white man I was
opposed to that, I couldn't understand how a person could
even say that.(72)
Racial categories were certainly a decisive factor in shaping the
struggles of garment workers. White workers would welcome the
assistance of African workers in their struggles when it
threatened their bargaining position. They were, however, very
reluctant to assist the African workers in their struggles. It
was the fact that they were black rather than fellow workers
which determined the actions of white workers. This is borne out
by the events of May/June 1928.
In May 1928 at the African Clothing factory In Germiston three
white workers were dismissed because they were organising for the
UTA. White workers at the factory went on strike demanding the
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re-instatement of the three women.(73) Workers in three other
factories joined in the strike. At the core of the strike lay the
fundamental issue of organising on the factory floor. Mr.Kramer,
the owner of African Clothing, stated that a principle was
involved in the strike, "that of whether they were to have
control of their own factory or take instructions from union
officials".(74)
The strike took on a festive atmosphere "of bright colours, gay
processions, of laughter and joking, of music and dancing".(75)
On the third day of the strike the SACWU decided to ballot its
members on whether to come out in sympathy with the strikers.(76)
The members of the SACWU were In favour of such an action if the
whites desired it.(77) A deputation from the SACWU visited the
strikers who were gathered at the Apollo Hall at the time.
The dancing at the Apollo was stopped and
the offer (from the SACWU) was announced.
It was received with cheers - and the dance .
continued.(78)
In the face of this joint action Kramer relented and reinstated
the three workers. The Communist Party hailed this as a great
victory for labour solidarity.(79) What was regarded as Important
was that the. Africans had "struck to help the whites and not for
any demands of their own".(80) But as Francine de Clercq has
pointed out, this was an isolated incident in specific
circumstances and is no way indicative of "a concerted effort by
the union leadership and rank and file to develop links among
workers across race and skill boundaries to build up a united
labour movement".(81) Events later in the month confirm de
Clercq's analysis. .
Since the African workers in the clothing Industry had begun
at^iu,jt:ig to organise into a trade union they had to endure
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increasing, victimisation and "severe persecution" from
employers.(82) The manufacturers refused to negotiate with the
SACWU, maintaining that the Native Affairs Department was "the
natural representative of native workers".(83) The TCMA also
opposed the attempts by the SACWU to effect a Wage Board
determination to cover the clothing industry in the Transvaal.
(84) When the issue of the right to trade union organisation
among Africans on the shop floor arose management took an
instransigent stand. It refused to grant this right and dismissed
union officials in the factories.(85) On 6 June 1928 the SACWU
became involved in its biggest struggle to date with management
over this, issue.
The strike organised by the SACWU in June 1928 in many ways
parallels that of the previous month under the auspices ' of the
WTA. A presser, Alfred Sepobe, who was employed at Clothing and
Shirt Manufacturers owned by S.Wunsh, was dismissed because of
his trade union activities.(86) His fellow African workers In the
clothing industry in Johannesburg, numbering between 200 and 250,
came out on strike demanding his reinstatement.(87) According to
union officials this was the first ever strike by Africans in
South Africa on the point of trade union organisation.(88) The
Rand Daily Mail also asserted that the refusal of the strikers
to meet with officials of the Native Affairs Department was
"unprecedented in the history of native industrial troubles".(89)
The strikers marched, to the Communist Hall In Fox Street carrying
the red banner of the Clothing Union. There they listened to
speeches made by the leader of the union and the Communist Party
and were issued with polony, bread and butter.(90) The SACWU
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tried to persuade the white workers to join them in their
struggle but without success, the WTA did not even issue a.
message of sympathy.(91) Management called in the police and the
chairman and the secretary of the union, Makabeni and Thibedi,
were arrested and charged with intimidation and 100 other
strikers were charged with dessertion and. for conducting an
illegal procession through the streets of Johannesburg.(92) In
the cells of Marshall Square prison management reached an
agreement with the strikers. The strikers were told that they
would be released on ball as long as they returned to work.(93)
In the position which they were in the strikers had Tittle
alternative but to accept the terms which were offered. The
strike fizzled out and was officially called off on 18 June. The
strikers were sentenced, under the Masters and Servants Act, to
ten days imprisonment or a SI.0.0 fine, and about a quarter of
them opted for the latter alternative. The white workers had not
been prepared to assist the black workers in their stuggles and
all that their union,the WTA, could say was that because of "the
many complications in connection with the dispute" it had decided
to remain neutral.(94)
When Solly Sachs became general secretary of the GWU in November
1928 its position on organising black workers did not alter much.
Although he was a firm believer in a non - racial South Africa he
realised that the racist attitudes of white workers made the
creation of a united front between black and white workers
totally impracticable.(95) The only realistic strategy was first
and foremost to Inculcate the white workers with a non - racial
working class consciousness. For this reason Sachs promoted the
Idea of separation of the workers to avoid racial friction and at
the same tinw to educate white workers to become, members of a.
••'•'•'•• • 1 9
united working class. What tended to occur in practice, however,
as a result of both the theoretical and tacticaT position held by
Sachs, is that he concerntrated almost- exclusively on the
struggles of white workers and all but neglected the struggles of
black workers. With white workers themselves reluctant to. join
with black workers the GWU was not set on the road of' inter -
racial solidarity. When the general strikes broke out in the
clothing industry in 1931 and 1932 black workers were virtually
ignored by the union.
In August 1931 an agreement had been reached between the SACWU
and the GWU that in the event of an industrial dispute they would
assist each other.(96) When the general strike broke out in 1931,
however, the the GWU did not call on the SACWU and conducted the
strike unilaterally. All the African workers were locked out and
did not receive any strike pay.(97) As long as the African
workers were locked out there was no need to bring them Into the
fray as had been the case in May 1928. The Communist Party
accused the GWU leadership of becoming "more and more the agent
of the bosses in splitting the ranks of the workers and In
betraying their struggles".(98) As a result of these tactics the
African Federation of Trade Unions (AFTU) set up by the Communist
Party began to organise among clothing workers. It appealed to
strikers to demand strike pay for African workers and "to fight
against the attempts of the Trade Union bureaucracy to betray
their struggle".(99) The AFTU failed to become a significant
force, in particular falling to make any headway among white :
clothing workers who were tied to their ideas of racial
exclusivism.(lOO) As the strike ended with an agreement to
maintain the status quo African workers returned to work but did
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not collect any strike pay for the time they were locked out. The
CP asked Gana Makabeni to sever the SACWU's connection with the
GWU because of the GWU's exclusivist tactics, but Makabeni, with
his wage guaranteed by the GWU, refused to do this.(101) He was
consequently expelled from the party.(102)
Towards the end of 1931 the GWU and the SACWU again started
pressing for a Wage Board determination to cover African workers
in the industry. This time it seemed that their efforts were
going to be successful and this caused much bitterness among
employers. Some of them attempted to stir up the workers against
the leadership of the GWU, Sachs in particular. They banked upon
the racialism of the workers to oust Sachs from the leadership
and to institiute a regime which would not pursue the
determination. They offered the author Herman Charles Bosman 425
to publish an article, -in his newspaper the NEW LSD, which was
scathing in its criticism of Sachs. Bosman then went to Sachs and
offered not to publish the article if Sachs paid him S50, but
Sachs turned the offer down.(103) In the next issue of the NEW
LSD Sachs was accused of going
to the Inchape Hall and sways in the arms of
skokiaan-reeking Zulu and Basuto women...It
is humiliating for a white woman to have to
compete, for a white man's favour,, with black
kaffir women from the kraal. We understand that
Sachs enjoyed these dances. We wonder what it
is that attracts him to kaffir women. Do
you like their frizzy hair, Sachs? Or their
prognathous jaws? Or their African fragrance?(104)
It is noteworthy that this article pointedly asked the question:
"We wonder how the thousands of factory girls, whose votes placed
Sachs in office will feel about this?"(105) The answer came in
court when when Sachs sued the editors of the NEW LSD for
defamation. Mary Mcnoughton, a member of the GWU and a friend of
Sachs stated:
If what was written about Sachs were true, I
would not want him to be the secretary of my
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Union. And 1f they were true the GWU would
have done a service by his being shown up.(106)
The case proved beyond doubt that the article was slanderous and
only contained the slightest hint of truth. Sachs had never
danced in his life before and certainly not "swayed in the arms
ofSkokiaan reeking Zulu or Msutu women".(107) Sachs won the case
and afterwards Bosman asked for a cut of the costs and damages
since Sachs would never have acquired the money If Bosnian had not
published the article.(108) Althogh the publication was hawked
outside Germiston factories It never aroused the ire of the white
workers enough to usurp Sachs. The fact that this tactic failed
says a great deal about the confidence of the workers In the
leadership acquiring benefits for the workers, particularly after
the successful 1931 strike where they had managed to offset a
reduction 1n wages. Once the article was proved to be largely
false little notice was taken of it.
In April 1932 a Mage Board determination was finally published by
the Minister for areas of the clothing Industry not covered by
the agreement. In terms of Wage Determination no.42 the minimum
wages laid down or males were SO.17.6 for the first year of
employment rising to S3.0.0 when the employee became qualified In
the sixth year. In the case of females it took three years to
qualify and the wage ranged from 40.15.0 to 62.0.0(109) The
determination ensured that the wages of whites would not be
undercut something the GWU had been pressing for 1n Its call for
a determination.
In 1932 there was another general strike in the clothing industry
but this time it was unsuccessful, and a 102 wage reduction was
accepted. After the strike the Minister of Justice, Pirow, issued
Sachs with a banishment order accusing Sachs of promoting
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hostility between Europeans and non-Europeans.(lib) Sachs found
this charge absolutely absurd since he had devoted all his life
"to the promotion of harmony between the European and non-
European members of the Union".(Ill) That Sachs was accused of
formenting revolution in 1932 is laughable for Sachs made no
attempt to organise blacks in the "32 strike.(112) When asked at
the mass trial of members of the union accused of scabbing in the
1932 strtike why the union did this Sachs answered:
Because the policy of the union was not a
correct policy for the workers...I admit
that we have not carried out the correct
policy in regard to the native workers.(113)
The GWU Central Executive was more intent on preventing African
workers entering the struggle as it might have caused divisions
among the white workers. This was the reason that Malan, the GWU
chairman, put forward for not bringing Africans into the struggle
when he gave evidence at the same trial.
Defender:Knowing that unity 1s absolutely
neccessary to win a strike, why did you not
put forward demands for the natives?
Malan:Because the white workers said that
they did not want to mix up with natives,
although...they were working for the same
boss.(114)
Thus was created the GWU's racial structure of maintaining
separate branches in order to ensure that the union remained
intact.
The SACWU was one of the few African trade unions to survive the
depression. It was the 1932 Wage Determination which resuscitated
what appeared to be a dying union.. Gana Makabeni was no longer
receiving wages from the GWU as the GWU's own funds were depleted
following the 1931 and 1932 strikes. He went out to work 1n a
factory and could only devote a limited amount of time to SACWU
work.(115) With the publication of the Wage Determination no.42
the fighting spirit of the SACWU was restored and it began
pushing for the determination to be strictly enforced,. It also
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pressed for inclusion under industrial council agreements* The
latter question was to take up a great deal of the SACWU's time
in the 1930s and 1940s. Financially, once the GWU was on a sound
footing, it started paying Makabenf's salary again, thus ensuring
a full-time: organiser. The GWU also provided the SACWU with
equipment such as typewriters and cars.(116)
The circumstances under which the the relationship between the
GWU and the SACWU operated in the 1930s altered in various ways.
One of the most Important changes was the- Interest In the
clothing Industry displayed by the government. This interest must
be viewed In the context of the Influx of poor whites Into the
cities. Between 1924 and 1933 the number of poor whites Increased
from approximately 200 000 to 300 000.(117) Their existence posed
a political threat to the dominant classes through their
potential militancy and the support they could Tend to the
African dominated classes.(118) The state, "acting to defend the
position of the dominant classes...became engaged In seeking to
transform the material conditions of existence of the 'poor
whites' by relocating them In various places In the division of
labour".(119) Initially relief works, such as digging and road'
building, funded by private capital and the state were set up to
provide temporary employment. Juvenile Affairs Boards were
established from 1914 onwards to provide poor whites with
industrial training and find jobs for them which would Involve
the utilisation of their skills.(120) The resposibility for these
schemes devolved entirely upon the state as capital withdrew its
support once the schemes began taking on a permanent basis.(121)
The Pact government extended the relief schemes In addition to
creating employment opportunities for whites tn government
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service and on the railways.(122) After the depression the state
again attempted to shift part of the accountability and financial
burden of finding employment for poor whites onto industry. The
fusion government began calling on industrialists "to accept
their °fair share1 of the "responsibility' for solving "the poor
white problem'".(123)
The clothing industry in particular was viewed as an alternative
avenue of employment for poor whites, in particular for young
males. Pressing would be an alternative to "pick and shovel work
at 6/- per day of which the Government may have to pay 50S to get
even this work for them".(124) It would be much more preferable
for the Department of Labour "to see the natives employed on pick
and shovel work and Europeans employed in the clothing industry.
(125) The government began putting pressure on the clothing
manufacturers to employ whites instead of Africans as pressers.
Following "direct representation made by the Department to
employers" some 200 white pressers were employed In the industry.
(126) Nonetheless when the East Rand Juveniile Affairs Board paid
a visit to clothing factories in Germiston it found that these
factories were, still employing African pressers.(127) The
employers maintained that the existing legislation prevented them
from replacing Africans with whites in this sphere.(128)
The Native pressers were operating on a much
lower scale than the white pressers, and
they had to do the same work. He felt that If
the Government would give the factories the
definite assurance that white pressers need
not be paid more than about S5 per month,
and that the existing ratio of two unqualified
white pressers to every qualified one would not
be enforced for at least a reasonable time, the
factories would be able to absorb another 120
white boys.(129)
On this basis the government attempted to exclude pressers from
the industrial council agreement negotiated between the TCHA and
the GWU and bring the wages of whites to a more competitive level
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with the wages of Africans.(130) The effect of this would have
been a reduction in the wages of white pressers, something .the
GWU would not tolerate.(131) Unable to secure the acquiescence of
the GWU to its plan the Department became more agressive and
refused to publish the agreement unless it was extended to
Africans.(132) The wages of whites would then not be reduced but
those of Africans increased. This time it was the manufacturers
on the industrial council who did not accede to this request
because they did not want to pay the higher wages and; feared
closer cooperation between the SACWU and the GWU as a
result.(133) The council did, however, assure the Divisional
Inspector of Labour, that the publication of the agreement as 1t
stood would not lead to a massive dismissal of white
pressers.(134) The Minister therefore decided to publish the
agreement but told the inspector to monitor carefully the
position of pressers and note any attempt to replace whites by
Africans.(135)
In April 1935 the Department once again urged that that the
industrial council agreement be extended to Africans. The council
again refused to do this but 1t did agree to exempt pressers from
the agreement. Experienced ppressers were to be paid S3 per week
(the wage under the Wage Determination) "in order to obviate the
replacement of Europeans by Natives".(136) On this basis the
Divisional' Inspector of Labour reported that there was "little
likelihood of any reduction in the percentage of unskilled
civilised labour resulting from the publication of the
Agreement". (137) The Minister therefore decided to publish the
agreement.(138)
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The Council's refusal to extend the agreement to Africans thus
seems to have come from the TCMA rather than the GWU. The GWU had
a major Interest In extending the agreement (to protect, the
position of its male members in particular). For the TCMA, on the
other hand, the inclusion of Africans could set a precedent and
place the Africans in a much stronger bargaining position. In' the
1940s the TCMA expressed this very fear when the SACWU made
representations to be included in the agreement.
a very dangerous principle was involved.
It meant that the African Workers' Union
could be involved with the Garment Workers'
Union and by this the latter would add some
three thousand workers to those on whose
behalf It would submit demands.(139)
So, as well as Africans strengthening their bargaining position,
the 6WU would also.
The attitudes of white workers towards cooperation with Africans
was also undergoing changes 1n the thirties. This was a result of
the vibrant shop-stewards organisation which was created In the
GWU and as a consequence of this white workers coming; into closer
contact with the leadership.(140) Johanna Cornelius changed her
previous racialist stance because she had "been taught
correctly'. (141) It seems that the higher up In the leadership
hierarchy one went the more one became subject to Influence from
the leaders, Sachs In particular. Basil Davidson commented, in
1952, that under Sachs' leadership some of them "have lost their
prejudices altogether and have grown Into comletely sane and
forward-looking human beings".(142) The shop-stewards 1n
particular had taken this progressive attitude to the colour
question.(143) This made for a more amicable relationship with
the SACWU.
The changes In the labour process during the 1930s, and in
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particular the introduction of the conveyor belt system, meant
that workers were coining into less and less contact with each
other on the factory floor.(144) Africans were completely
separate from whites in the work environment and there is little
evidence of racial friction. Pressing was becoming Increasingly
mechanised. In place of hand irons the Hoffman press was befng
used. According to one factory owner "the output of an employee
operating a Hoffman press was five times that could be turned out
by the same employee pressing by hand".(145) Despite the drop In
numbers of African males in the industry in 1934 (mainly doing
pressing) from-1936 onwards the trend was reversed. Pressing came
into its own as an operation with separate rooms and even whole
factories being set aside for it. This allowed for greater
organisation among African workers. By 1938 the SACWU had 429
members (approximately half the total African workforce In the
industry).(146) It had also established a stop order system in '
four factories by mid 1939. (147) Indeed, African clothing
workers were one of the highest paid groups of African workers in
Johannesburg in 1939.(148) These gains were made with the aid of
the GWU and Sachs In particular who gave both financial and
organisational assistance.(149)
CONCLUSION
This examination of the GWU's racial policies In Its early years
reveals that it did not commit Itself to a racially Inclusive
approach. While certainly it did not organise only among white
workers to protect its constituency, it also never totally
ignored racial lines and organised on a broad basts. It Instead
opted for an intermediate course of organising black workers, tn
parallel trade unions. This type of separation was necessary,
according to the union leadership, 1n order to maintain the
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essential unity of the GWU. It became an even stronger reason
when the Afrikaner Nationalists tried to destroy the GWU in the
late 1930s using racism as one of their weapons.
While it may be argued that in the general context of the white
South African workforce this attitude of partial separation of
the GWU's was unique, it was a far cry from genuine inter -
racial solidarity. This enabled the GWU, on the one hand, to
assist in the organisation of black workers, but on the other to
ensure that' the bargaining power of its own members was not
undermined. Through the control of these black trade unions, a
trend which intensified in the late 1930s as more and more black
workers entered the industry, the bargaining position of the
white workers in the clothing industry in the Transvaal was
firmly insured.
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